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Explaining intra- and between country 
variations in attitudes to differences in 
pay in Scandinavia 
By Andreas Pihl Kjærsgård 
Ph.D.-fellow at Centre for Comparative Welfare Studies (CCWS) 
 
First draft… 
Abstract 
Introduction 
The Scandinavian countries Denmark, Norway and Sweden are in existing literature in general 
often seen as being quite exceptional countries. The exceptionality argument can be based on a 
uniqueness in the institutional settings e.g. the universal/social democratic welfare regime and 
the industrial relations system (Addison, 2003; Christiansen, Petersen, Edling, & Haave, 2005; 
Ervasti, 2008; G. Esping-Andersen, 1990a; G. Esping-Andersen, 1990a; G. Esping-Andersen, 
1990b; G. Esping-Andersen, 1990b; G. Esping-Andersen, 1999; C. A. Larsen, 2006; S. Svallfors, 
2004; S. Svallfors, 1997). The exceptionality is also found on key quantitative measures of 
society success e.g. social- and institutional trust, level of happiness, Gini-coefficient and 
measures of social mobility (Ervasti, 2008; Larsen, 2013). On the attitudinal side; existing 
research has documented a high level of support for redistributive policies and thus an egalitarian 
distribution of net incomes as well as uniquely egalitarian attitudes towards the distribution of 
gross pay in the Scandinavian countries (Ervasti, 2008; Kjærsgård, 2012b; C. A. Larsen, 2006).  
The aggregated picture revealed so fair fits well with a description of the Scandinavians as a 
uniform mass of homo socialdemocraticus (G. Esping-Andersen, 1999; C. A. Larsen, 2006), 
with in time consistent attitudes legitimising their rather peculiar institutional and societal 
2 
 
arrangements known as the Nordic model
1
. By disaggregating the measure of attitudes towards 
the distribution of gross pay; Kjærsgård (2012a) have shown that this aggregated picture of 
similarity hides significant differences between the Nordic countries. His results reveal that in 
the period 1992-2009, the Swedish responses follow a distinctly different pattern, than the 
Danish and Norwegian responses that are more alike. Kjærsgård’s (2012a) conclusion is thus that 
in Sweden big between group differences exist and remain, but at the same time the intra-group 
differences are small, also in 2009. In Denmark and Norway the differences between groups are 
small (with notable exceptions), whereas the intra-group differences skyrockets in 2009 for a 
majority of the groups investigated (more so in Denmark, than in Norway)
2
.  
The point of departure of this article is the empirical results described above.  More specifically 
we will try to try to explain, why the intra- and between country variations in attitudes to 
differences in pay in Scandinavia revealed by Kjærsgård (2012a) exist – and thus that Swedish 
attitudes seems to follow a distinctively different path than the corresponding Danish and 
Norwegian. Building on this premise the article will investigate which effect the perception of 
the actual level of income differences has on the norms of the Scandinavians to the just level of 
the same. This actually means focussing on three distinct dimensions: firstly the norms of, what 
actually is the just level of income differences in the country, secondly the perception of how big 
the actual differences are in society and thirdly what is the correlation between the two. 
Furthermore, following Kjærsgård (2012a) we will firstly disaggregate the analyses of on 
generations, social classes and political orientations. Secondly a time perspective will be 
maintained in all analyses. Result of 1992, 1999 and 2009 will thus be present in all analyses 
below. All in all this adds up to a very complex design, in spite really only investigating the 
relationship between two central variables. Before we continue, two important issues will be 
dealt with – the operationalization of the two central measures of the article and the definition of 
central concept continuously referred to throughout the article. 
The two central measures – the norms about the just level of income differences in society and 
the perception of, how big these actually are – are both variables created by combining others 
                                                          
1
 And a range of other acronyms: “social democratic welfare regime”, “the Nordic welfare regime”, “the Nordic 
welfare state”, “the universal welfare state”, “the institutional welfare state” and in the Nordic settings simply “the 
welfare state” (Larsen 2013). 
2
 The between group differences are in all cases measured by comparing the median values of the various social 
groups. The intra-groups differences are likewise measured by comparing the standard deviations of the various 
groups. 
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present in the International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) Social Inequality modules II-IV, 
which are the datasets used here. The first norm-measure stems from the survey question: ‘What 
do you think people in these jobs ought to be paid, regardless of what they actually get…?. Using 
this a ratio is created for, how many times more a respondent thinks a chairman of a large 
national corporation ought to earn than either an unskilled factory worker, or a shop assistant. 
The second perception-measure is created in exactly the same manner, only ought is switched to 
actually earn usually.  
A central concept throughout the article is what we denote as the classic social-democratic 
polity. It can be defined as an orientation by the majority in the political sphere towards trying to 
break down societal structures, prohibiting some groups in society from enjoying the same 
opportunities as others in society. This of course rests on an ontological foundation among a 
majority of the political actors and organised populace: they must actually envision these 
prohibiting societal structures to exist and be crucial for societal outcomes
3
. On the other hand, it 
must also be emphasised that a classic social-democratic polity is not to be understood as a 
consensus-culture. The structural ontological view also prompts the better-off groups in society 
to be equally group-conscious. The political cleavages in society are thus expected to separate 
social groups or classes having different material interests than other social groups in society.  
The antithesis to this ontology is obviously an individualistic approach, where societal outcomes 
are seen as a result of differences in individual effort, ability or luck. If such ontology is shared 
by a majority of the political actors and organised populace, cleavages do not follow 
materialictic group-interests and a classic social-democratic polity does not exist (Rothstein, 
1998) . 
In the article it will be argued and shown, that the differences between Sweden and 
Denmark/Norway revealed by Kjærsgård (2012a) are not that surprising after all. Even if 
compared to other western countries the three Scandinavian countries seem quite alike, their 
political history of the last century and especially within the last two decades has been quite 
diverse. The overall argument of the article is that in Sweden the polity maintains and reproduces 
                                                          
3
 The underlying assumption behind the notion is thus also a positive freedom concept – the state must help people, 
so they have freedom to something, they are not otherwise capable of. This is in opposition to a negative freedom 
concept, where freedom is understood as freedom from oppression.  
Definition of positive and negative freedom: "negative" freedom hold that only the presence of something can 
render a person unfree; writers adhering to the concept of "positive" freedom hold that the absence of something 
may also render a person unfree (MacCallum, 1967). 
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perceptions and identities linked to a society dominated by social groups with different material 
interests and societal structures prohibiting equal opportunity. In many respects the Sweden has 
retained a classic social-democratic polity from “the golden age of welfare capitalism
4
” till 
today.  
In Norway and even more so in Denmark on the contrary, the modern political identity of their 
populaces have not been dominated by this group-struggle at all. The national Danish and 
Norwegian narrative are ones of successful consensual welfare-societies, where the different 
social groups and interests in society in the past got together: alleviating the societies’ social 
problems, eliminating any real class differences and thus also the prohibiting societal structures 
perceived to exist in the past. The political struggle and cleavages in these two countries of the 
last decade has clearly been value-oriented and not traditional materialistically class-oriented.   
In opposition to Sweden the article thus finds clues that the Danish and Norwegian polities 
especially in the last decade have departed quite a lot from their classic social-democratic 
foundations. 
The article starts out in the following section by giving a presentation of the modern political 
history of the Scandinavian countries, with a focus on the framing of group-differences and a 
structural perspective on society. One can look at political history through many different lenses; 
in the third section we will therefore present a theoretical model designed to be able to actually 
test the particular version of the political history presented here, and the implications on the 
development in attitudes of the Scandinavian to the norms of just income differences in society. 
To track the diversified development through time between Sweden and Denmark/Norway, a 
rather complex design will be needed. The design is to allow both within- and between country 
variations and changes over time on each of the three above mentioned dimensions. Then a 
fourth section presenting the results follows. Lastly a conclusion will some up and elaborate the 
results.  
                                                          
4
 The period of general welfare state expansion in the western world lasting from, when the western economies 
recovered after WWII till the oil crises of the seventies – approximately 1950-1973(Flora, 1986).  
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A modern Scandinavian political history in relations to framing group-
differences and a structural perspective on society 
The rather common political history of the Scandinavian countries of, what is often known as the 
“golden age of welfare capitalism” is well-described (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990 29-33; Esping-
Andersen 1999, 1-94). In all three countries the welfare state went through a period of rapid 
expansion in the period. One of the main normative goals behind this expansion was to insure the 
same possibilities - or positive freedom - for the working class as the well-off in society, by 
expanding social rights to all citizens
5
. The working class were obviously frontrunners in this 
endeavour, but a great deal of literature has by now revealed that the “social-democratic welfare 
regime” to a large extent is a result of compromises made between the workers and the peasants 
(G. Esping-Andersen, 1990b; Korpi, 1983b). In Sweden the workers movement was markedly 
stronger, than in Denmark and Norway though. In several periods the Swedish social democratic 
party managed to maintain around 50 percent of the votes, something which was not 
accomplished in either Denmark or Norway (see figure 2 below).  
Our data does not cover so far back – we have datasets from 1992, 1999 and 2009; therefore we 
can only guess what imprint this context had on the Scandinavian identities, perceptions and 
attitudes several decades ago. It seems quite clear though, that in all three countries – and in 
other western countries for that matter – the class differences and structures prohibiting some 
groups more than others have been very salient and central in the political reality people in the 
societies faced. As the social rights gradually expanded, the welfare state in all three countries 
became part of the countries’ national narratives and thus the form of nationalism and national-
identity dominating each country (Anderson, 1983; C. A. Larsen, 2008; Smith, 2003). In general 
the contextual imprint on the identities, perceptions and therefore attitudes of the Scandinavians 
in the three countries must therefore have been rather similar in this period in relations to 
attitudes to differences in levels of pay. Furthermore, being almost a tautological argumentation, 
it is clear that this imprint should have resembled, what is above defined as entailed in a classic 
social-democratic polity.  
Because of the unique strength of the social-democratic party in Sweden, the Swedish working 
class have maybe, to a higher extent than in Norway and Denmark, been able to define and form 
                                                          
5
 For a classic demarcation between civil, political and social rights (Marshall, 1963). 
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the welfare state as they wanted, without having to compromise with the farmers. This could 
possibly have led the swedes to understand their successful welfare state more as a result of the 
struggles of the working class, winning the class struggle and imposing progressive reforms 
against the will of the other classes in society. In Denmark and Norway the formation of the 
likewise successful welfare state is a result of “the cooperating democracy”, where the classes 
got together and created reforms benefitting everybody. 
As we leap forward in time approaching the period covered by our data – 1992 and 1999 – one 
could argue that Denmark and Norway more and more departs from the classical social-
democratic polity, while Sweden to a much larger extent retains it. Several clues indicating this 
can be found in existing research on differences between the Scandinavian countries in regards to 
how to handle issues of gender, ethnicity and health policy. Although these areas are 
distinctively different from each other and even more so from what we are investigating here – 
norms about just income differences – a similarity in conclusions between them are striking, and 
we propose here that the same pattern might be traced to our area.  
In historical comparisons of all three areas, an overall conclusion is that while Norway and even 
more Denmark have departed from the path of Sweden as time has progressed. In Sweden a 
structural focus has been maintained in the policy formation and especially in the discourse 
concerning the nature of the problems related to these areas till today. In Norway and especially 
Denmark, the explanation for undesirable outcomes has more and more been framed in an 
individualistic manner (Borchorst & Teigen, 2010; Breidahl, 2012; Vallgarda, 2003). While the 
lower employment rates of ethnic groups in Sweden for example has been framed mainly as a 
result of discrimination among the employers, a skill-deficit etc., in Denmark on the other hand 
the outcome has been framed more as a result of lack of effort, a dependency culture among 
ethnic groups etc. A tendency can thus be identified, when investigating several areas with 
problems that could or could not be framed in a structural manner. It would not be surprising if 
an analogy of the same discoursinal logic could be transferred to the view on legitimate 
differences in income levels, which, given the long history of the class struggle, clearly also is an 
area, that if framed by its very nature easily implies a structural view of society’s problems.  
One thing is the framing and discourse, another clue supporting the idea, that Norway and 
Denmark gradually departs their original path shared with Sweden, can be found when looking at 
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the development among the relationship and strength of various political actors, who are prone 
to problematize the distribution of incomes in society and more importantly promote structural 
discourses (Korpi, 1983a). The strength and discoursinal impact of a political actor is notoriously 
hard to quantify, and in interpreting any such measure one has to be cautious. Nevertheless, we 
will try and do so anyway. A first actor to look at could be the trade unions. Figure 1 below 
portrays the development in trade union density rates in the Scandinavian countries since 1960:  
FIGURE 1. Trade union density rates in Denmark, Norway and Sweden 1960 – 2011. 
  
Trade union density corresponds to the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members, divided by the total 
number of wage and salary earners (OECD Labour Force Statistics). 
Source: www.stats.oecd.org. 
 
Figure 1 show that while the Danish trade union density rates peaked in 1983 and goes into a 
rapid decline after 1996, the Swedish rates peaks ten years later in 1993. The Norwegian rates on 
the other hand are quite stable, but never reach the Danish and Swedish levels. Trade union 
density rates are not a perfect measure of the discoursinal power of the trade unions combined, 
nor do they say, which discourse the trade unions actually try to promote. But, if we see powerful 
trade unions and the trend in trade union density as an institution likely to correlate with the 
traditional social-democratic polity in at least Denmark and Sweden, the Danish decline after the 
1983 fit the expectations of an evaporating structural perspective from early on. The figure does 
not reveal much about the power of a possible Norwegian classic social-democratic polity 
though. Figure 2 below therefore plots the voter share of the traditional political organ of the 
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workers-movement on the various general elections in the three countries – the social-democratic 
parties: 
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FIGURE 2. Share of votes for the social-democratic party on general elections in Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden 1890-2011. 
 
Results combined with data from from Statistics Denmark (DST), Statistics Norway (SSB) and Statistics Sweden (SCB). 
 
Although not as easy to read as figure 1, figure 2 reveals that while the Danish and Norwegian 
labour parties started a gradual decline in their voting share already in the 1950’s, the Swedish 
social democratic party have managed to keep an average voting share of above 40 % until the 
mid-nineties. While the Norwegian social-democratic voters’ share from around 1970 till today 
seems to have stabilised around 35 %, the Danish social democrats seems to follow an almost 
linear declining trend, with no clear bottom value in sight. Again although one has to be cautious 
over-interpreting these results. The Swedish social democrats have maintained a much broader 
electoral appeal than their Norwegian and especially Danish counterparts. The swedes have until 
the mid-nineties and thus in their transition to a post-industrial society stuck both with their 
trade-unions and their social-democratic party. This is not the case in either Denmark or Norway. 
The Norwegians in the nineties still had a quite popular social-democratic party, while the 
Danish trade unions still had a quite strong grip on the workforce. 
If these quantitative comparisons can be trusted as measures of discoursinal power and impact of 
the trade unions and social democratic parties, the joker is still, whether the trade unions and 
social-democratic parties actually have promoted a structural based view of society and have 
helped maintain the classic social-democratic polity?  
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This leads us towards describing the events after the turn of the century. Around this time, 
extreme right-wing parties in Denmark and Norway – respectively the Danish peoples party and 
the Norwegian Party of Progress – both gained success. This success was furthermore both 
electoral-wise but also in setting a strict immigration-critical agenda for the political debate. 
Perhaps even more importantly, both parties’ electoral base was mainly the old social-democratic 
working-class. In the Danish election studies have on this background concluded the 2000’s was 
a decade dominated by value- and especially immigrant-oriented politics, not old class-politics. 
In the same decade an economic boom was experienced, with a corresponding plummeting 
unemployment rates reaching levels as low as the 1960’s, before especially in Denmark and 
Sweden coming to an abrupt stop with the financial crisis in 2008:  
FIGURE 3. Annual harmonised unemployment rates in percentage of working age population 
15-64 for Denmark, Norway and Sweden 1983-2011. 
 
Source: www.stats.oecd.org. 
 
The social democrats in Denmark slowly and reluctantly followed suit accepting tougher 
immigration policies, but also a version of the ruling right-wing government (in)famous “tax-
stop”. The only labour market related “structural” problem, which was really continuously on the 
agenda in the period, was the lower employment rates of the “non-ethnic” Danes. This problem 
framed as described above as a result of a lack of effort and motivation among the immigrants, 
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which ultimately was seen as a problem with their culture. On the political front in Denmark it 
seems safe to say, that the classic social-democratic polity more or less disappeared in the haze 
of the immigrant question and economic boom of the 2000’s. The social-democrats did not help 
the situation, but played along exactly the same discourses.  
The Danish traditional trade unions in the same way also quickly lost power in this period. When 
the leaders of the social-democrats and the liberal party one night in 1998 agreed on a significant 
reform of the early-retirement scheme, this marked the beginning of the end of the old 
corporative tradition in Denmark. Up to this point all major labour market related reforms had 
seen the major actors on the labour market included in both the decision-making process, but 
also often the implementation of reforms. Other tragedies also hit the traditional unions though. 
In 2002 across-trade unemployment insurance funds (tværfaglige a-kasser) was legalised, 
thereby a traditional main channel of recruitment of new members were weakened for the trade 
unions. In 2006 closed shop agreements were forbidden, diminishing the monopolistic power of 
the trade unions versus various employers. On the workplaces the employees were encouraged to 
use yearly appraisal conversations (MUS-samtaler), with the boss, to settle matters of pay or 
working environment instead of turning to the union representative. All this coincided with a rise 
in memberships of the alternative “yellow” unions, explicitly a-political, and the decline of 
membership of almost all traditional unions (see figure 1). No matter what, this substantial 
weakening of the power of the traditional trade unions have not helped maintain a structural 
focus in relations to attitudes to income differences in Denmark.  
The situation in Sweden on the other hand has if not opposite from Denmark, then a much less 
severe turn from the classic social-democratic political culture. Firstly of all the social-democrats 
managed to stay in power uninterruptedly from 1994-2006 (see also figure 2). Secondly and 
more importantly a main theme of the Swedish general elections has remained of economical 
character. The agendas of the social-democrats and the main right-wing party - the liberal 
conservative party (Moderata samlingspartiet) - on these issues have remained clearly 
distinguishable on each election. Thirdly the major parties in Sweden and the media in general 
have refused to buy into the same kind of immigrant critical rhetoric seen in Denmark and 
Norway. The immigrant critical party in Sweden – the Swedish democrats 
(Sverigedemokraterna) – only barely managed to gain parliamentary representation for the first 
12 
 
time in the election of 2010.  This is quite different from the Norwegian and Danish experience. 
The Norwegian progress party have since the election in 2005 been the second largest 
Norwegian party, while the Danish peoples party have since the election in 2001 been the third 
largest Danish party. There is thus good reason to believe that the political identity and 
consciousness of the swedes to a high extent also in the 2000’s have been defined in terms of 
traditional economic cleavages, rather than value- and especially immigration-oriented cleavages 
as in Denmark and Norway.  
In 2008 the financial crisis struck the western world. The Danish boom ended abruptly and the 
Norwegian oil fund lost 1/3 of its value on the global stock- and bond markets. Sweden on the 
other hand came through the crisis with fewer bruises, and quickly regained a by western 
standards very impressive growth rate (see also figure 3 above): 
FIGURE 4. Annual real-GDP growth rates for Denmark, Norway and Sweden 1950-2011. 
 
Source: www.stats.oecd.org. 
 
The general economic trends are less interesting for our purpose, than the sudden media-attention 
to firstly the salaries, bonuses and profits in the top of the hierarchy in the financial sector, and 
secondly the immense political power and importance the big financial institutions had gained on 
the whole economy, and the economic situation of everyday people. In other words the question 
about the distribution of resources and economic power in society clearly came on the main 
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media agenda in all western- and also Scandinavian countries. We must therefore expect to see 
some kind of financial crisis shock on perceptions and attitudes in all Scandinavian countries. 
But, our guess is the Swedish respondents were better prepared, already having a clear 
conceptual framework and a political identity linked to the exactly the type of political questions 
brought about by the financial crisis – a conceptual framework and political identity long gone in 
Norway and Denmark. In the following section, we will elaborate this hypothesis in a theoretical 
model, which will then be operationalized and tested. 
A theoretical model - The impact of a traditional social-democratic polity 
on group-consciousness (salience and a structural perspective) 
The main theoretical thesis of the article is; that the reason Kjærsgård (2012a) finds the Swedes 
portraying a remarkably different pattern from the Danes and Norwegians on attitudes to 
difference in levels of pay, has to do with Denmark and Norway gradually and especially the 
past decade departs from the social-democratic polity of “the golden age of welfare capitalism”, 
while Sweden more or less retains the path. Furthermore the assumption is that the polity, which 
is a macro level phenomenon, in feedback effects translates into the political identity and thus 
the perceptions and attitudes of people in society at the micro level. Therefore the thesis of this 
article is furthermore, that we can measure the change in the orientation of the polity by relating 
the development in norms about just income differences, with the development in the 
perceptions of the actual income differences. And, investigate the development in the relation 
between the two variables over time, disaggregated on three central potential cleavages in 
society. Figure 5 below outlines the causal reasoning behind this, which will then be elaborated 
below. Figure 6 then deduces hypothesis regarding, which attitudes and perception to expect 
from different groups of Scandinavians at various points in time, by combining the contextual 
description above with the theoretical model of figure 5: 
  
14 
 
FIGURE 5. Proposed model for the connection between the organisation and functioning of the 
polity, group-consciousness and the political identity-, perceptions- and attitudes of people in 
society. 
  
Macro-level 
Organization and functioning of the polity 
- Economical- vs. other cleavages 
- Structural vs. individualistic ontology 
Micro-level 
Political identity: Degree and organization of group consciousness 
- Norms: degree of –group internal and -external consistency 
- Perception: salience 
- Relationship between perception and norms: salience 
Micro level effects in a strong classic social-democratic polity 
- Norms: high degree of group internal consistency, big 
differences between groups 
- Perception: high degree of salience and knowledge in 
general  the financial crisis is only a shock to selected 
weaker groups 
- Relationship between perception and norms: weak 
correlation, especially for highly mobilized groups 
Micro level effects in a non-classic social-democratic polity 
- Norms: low degree of group internal consistency, small 
differences between groups 
- Perception: low degree of salience and knowledge in 
general  the financial crisis is a big shock for all groups 
- Relationship between perception and norms: strong 
correlation for all, but the most mobilized groups  
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In the first box from the top in figure 5, we have the macro level concept of polity, which as 
defined in the introduction is a kind of ideological and ontological superstructure of society. This 
superstructure is assumed through feedback-mechanisms to influence the political identity of 
people in society (meaning both perceptions and attitudes). Surely this superstructure is also 
dependent on, and changes by receiving inputs and legitimacy from the people of society 
(Easton, 1979) – the assumption is thus not that the causal-arrow goes only from the macro to the 
micro level imposing a kind of false consciousness on the population-sheep. Instead the 
assumption is some kind of symbiosis or interdependence between the two levels. For our 
purpose here the analytically interesting arrow is the macromicro level feedback arrow. What 
is assumed important about the polity for our purpose is that two crucial dimensions are defined 
here. Firstly, which political cleavages define the polity at a given point in time, and secondly 
whether the polity promotes an individualistic or structural view on these cleavages and society 
in general. These two dimensions seems likely to be highly correlated and in the polity-version 
defined in the introduction – the classic social-democratic polity – the cleavages follow 
materialistically defined group-interest and a structural view on society or ontology is promoted. 
The second box shows the assumed “effects” at certain point in time on the structure of political 
identities regarding just income differences of the populace, by being exposed to different types 
of polities (again effects is not the most precise word to use, since we rather assume correlation). 
The idea is that these “effects” are traceable on three dimensions:  
1) On how the norms regarding the just income differences themselves are structured on 
social groups in society.  
2) The pattern on how the big the actual income differences are perceived to be, structured 
on the same social groups. 
3) The relationship or correlation between 1 and 2. 
In a country having a strong social-democratic polity at a given point in time (the lower left box), 
we therefor assume the following:  
1)  Norms: high degree of group internal consistency, big differences between groups. This 
was the result of Kjærsgård (2012b) regarding Sweden, being the empirical inspiration 
for the article.  
16 
 
2) Perception: high degree of salience and knowledge in various social groups general  
a. The financial crisis is only a shock to selected weaker groups. 
3) Relationship between perception and norms: weak correlation, especially for highly 
mobilized groups. 
The short version of, my ideas of, why we expect these results in a country with a classic social-
democratic polity at a given point in time, is as based on the high degree salience and strong 
political identity and affiliation with a given social group. The salience is a result of the political 
cleavages focusing exactly this dimension, while the corresponding structural ontology 
encourages people to see themselves as a group with different interests, than other groups in 
society.  
Because of this strong group affiliation, people internally in a social group will receive, trust and 
share certain information sources. In a different social group, other information sources will be 
received, trusted and shared. This leads to a high degree of group-internal similarities in 
perception of the actual degree of income differences in society, but not necessarily a big degree 
of similarity between-groups. Furthermore, because of the salience of the subject – we will not 
expect a big degree of deviation from the group median. People will not answer, on what is “on 
top of the head”, but know exactly what to answer such a question (Zaller, 1992).  
It is easy to make an analogy of this argumentation, to the norms about just income differences. 
Svallfors (2004) finds and argues that the intra-class attitudinal differences in Sweden are much 
larger, than in other countries, where the actual class differences are much bigger. Svallfors 
(2004) explains this paradox by arguing that the class differences are both more institutionalised 
and politicised in Sweden, than in the other countries.  
If we turn to the relationship between perception and norms; the argumentation is a direct 
methodological consequence of Zaller’s (1992) description of the meaning of salience. In all 
three surveys, we are using as data in our empirical investigation here (ISSP 1992, 1999 and 
2009), the respondents where firstly asked about their perception of the average pay of various 
occupations, and afterwards their view on the just level of the same i.e. norms. What is “on top 
of the head”, when answering what the just income differences are, is thus clearly the perception 
of actual differences. If the subject is already salient in the mind of the respondent’s political 
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identity before answering the questionnaire, he/she will have a conceptual framework, with 
which to separate the two. We thus expect to see a much weaker correlation between the two in a 
country with a classic social-democratic polity at a given point in time. Furthermore this 
correlation should be even weaker for highly mobilised groups within such a country.  
In figure 6 below these theses are combined with the contextual development in the 
Scandinavian countries described above. 
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FIGURE 6. Hypothesis regarding expected micro level effects (perceptions and norms) in the 
three Scandinavian countries in different points in modern time.  
“the golden age of welfare 
capitalism” 
1992-1999 Up to 2009 – the financial crisis  
 
 
 
  
A rather common classic social-
democratic polity 
1.0 Sweden  
A stable classic social-
democratic polity:  
- Salience 
- Group-consciousness 
- A structural perspective 
2.0 Denmark/Norway 
Polities in transition:  
- Declining salience 
- Diminished class-
consciousness 
- An evaporating 
structural perspective  
1.1 Sweden  
A stable classic social-
democratic polity:  
- Salience 
- Group-consciousness 
- A structural perspective 
 Almost no financial 
crisis-shock 
2.1 Denmark/Norway 
The unprepared polity:  
- Drastically re-spawned 
salience 
- No re-spawned class-
consciousness 
- A structure-blind perspective 
 The financial crisis as an 
eye-opening shock  
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Results 
We now turn to test our model; we start out by the aggregated differences between the countries 
in the three surveys: 
 
TABLE 1. Aggregated attitudes to the perception of the level of differences in levels of pay, 
attitudes to the just level of the same and correlation between the two in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 
2009 in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.  
 1992 N: 1999 N: 2009 N: 
Denmark       
- Perception of the level of differences in levels of pay (a)   2.53 (0.134) 1440 3.81 (0.522) 1348 
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b)   2.00 (0.083) 1418 2.00 (0.326) 1302 
- Correlation between a and b (c)   .380 (0.013) 1398 .273 (0.015) 1298 
Norway       
- Perception of the level of differences in levels of pay (a) 3.33 (0.051) 1394 2.98 (0.055) 597 4.55 (0.544) 1395 
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b) 2.00 (0.035) 1329 2.13 (0.032) 936 2.33 (0.195) 1381 
- Correlation between a and b (c) .410 (0.015) 1326 .427 (0.023) 563 .137 (0.009) 1373 
Sweden       
- Perception of the level of differences in levels of pay (a) 3.00 (0.090) 668 3.87 (0.200) 1010 4.57 (1.36) 1038 
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b) 1.92 (0.063) 622 2.08 (0.103) 967 2.22 (0.180) 1003 
- Correlation between a and b (c) .419 (0.021) 618 .228 (0.013) 946 0.042 (0.004) 998 
a 
The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average 
of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index. Shown are 
medians and standard deviations in brackets. 
b 
Created the same way as index a, but on the basis of the items measuring, what the different occupations ought to earn, instead of what the 
respondents think they actually earn. Shown are medians and standard deviations in brackets. 
c 
Shown are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors in brackets. 
 
 
Although table 1 can be regarded as portraying quite preliminary results, quite interesting things 
are revealed. If we start out describing the development in the median levels of perception of the 
difference in levels of pay (a), a financial crisis shock clearly seems to be present in the 2009 
results. Especially in Denmark and Norway both the medians and the corresponding standard 
deviations explode in 2009. In Sweden the median level is also markedly bigger in 2009, than in 
1999 – the change is not bigger than the one from 1992 to 1999 though. The Swedish results of 
2009 could instead of a shock suggest just a steadily rising tendency. On the other hand, the 
Swedish standard deviations in 2009 are very large (see also the appendix for disaggregated 
versions of this measure on generations, class and political vote on last election). 
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As it was revealed in Kjærsgård (2012,), the aggregated norm medians (b) hides significant 
results. As also Kjærsgård (2012b) revealed, there are almost no change in either of the countries 
in their aggregated medians over time. The Swedish standard deviations rise steadily over the 
period, while the corresponding Danish and Norwegian explode in 2009 – again this seems a 
sign of a financial crisis effect in these two countries in 2009. Recalling the results of Kjærsgård 
(2012a) also presented in the introduction, this rise in Danish and Norwegian aggregated 
standard deviations is a result of a sharp rise for all social groups investigated, while the 
corresponding Swedish aggregated rise is a result of a sharp rise for only a few selected groups
6
. 
Lastly table 1 also portrays the correlation between the two in each country in each survey. What 
we see is that in all countries the correlation is much weaker in 2009, than in the previous 
surveys. This is maybe not that surprising. Firstly the financial crisis may have sparked 
revelations of the actual level of difference in pay in society, but norms are probably and 
hopefully more sluggish. Secondly it corresponds with the Zaller (1992) argument described 
above: when a subject is salient, you are more prone to tap opinions in a survey, than just what’s 
“on top of the head”, that you would otherwise tap. It should be noticed, that the Swedish 
correlation in 2009 is much weaker, than the corresponding Norwegian and especially Danish. 
The aggregated results, although preliminary, fit the expectations quite well. We see a financial 
crisis shock on the perception of the level of income differences in all countries, but the shock is 
less severe in Sweden. In the appendix we even see, that some social groups’ standard deviations 
do almost not rise at all from 1999 to 2009, which is not the case for any Danish or Norwegian 
social group. We know from Kjærsgård (2012b) that in aggregated median terms the norms of 
the same are much more stable, also in the face of the financial crisis.  But recalling Kjærsgård 
(2012a) the Swedish pattern disaggregated is quite different from the corresponding Danish and 
Norwegian. We also see weaker correlations in all countries, when the salience of the subject 
rises with the financial crises. The correlation is also here markedly weaker in Sweden in 2009, 
than in the two other countries – the level of salience seems even higher. On the other hand, the 
                                                          
6
 Elder/retired, the above higher secondary educational group, former and non-members of trade unions, the voters 
of the liberal conservatives and lower- and upper middle class (Kjærsgård 2012b). 
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rather strong correlation in all countries in 1999 and especially 1992 suggest, that the level of 
salience of the subject was rather low in all countries – also Sweden prior to the 2000’s. 
As before the aggregated results of table 1 can potentially hide important results on the meso-
level (Kjærsgård 2012a). We will therefore now present three tables – one for each country – 
disaggregating and further investigating, what the correlations above actually signify. We start 
out with the results of Denmark in table 2 below. In each survey we estimate three hierarchical 
regression systems. One where we disaggregate the bivariate correlation on generations, one on 
social class and one on political vote on last election. In each of the hierarchical systems we 
estimate three models:     
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TABLE 2. Estimating group variations in attitudes to the just level of differences in pay in ISSP 1999 and 2009 in Denmark. 
 1999 2009 
 Bivariate Trivariate With interactions Bivariate Trivariate With interactions 
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b) 0.380**** 0.381**** 0.926**** 0.273**** 0.272**** 0.184**** 
- Born 1980 and thereafter  -0.483 2.349****  -0.049 -1.729 
- Born 1970-1979  -0.056 2.326****  -0.745 -2.144** 
- Born 1960-1969  -0.269 1.786****  -0.330 -3.840**** 
- The baby boom generation  -0.262 1.399****  -1.410 -2.010** 
- War and pre-war generations (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.) 
- Born 1980 and thereafter*b   -0.835****   0.169**** 
- Born 1970-1979*b   -0.744****   0.147*** 
- Born 1960-1969*b   -0.620****   0.429**** 
- The baby boom generation*b   -0.520****   0.035 
- War and pre-war generations*b (ref.)   (ref.)   (ref.) 
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b) 0.385**** 0.383**** 0.262**** 0.281**** 0.280**** 0.390**** 
- Salariat  0.504* -1.318****  0.705 2.149** 
- Intermediate employee'  -0.072 -0.277  0.339 -0.986 
- Small employers and self-employed  0.229 -0.606  0.434 0.396 
- Lower sales and service  -0.114 0.259  0.218 1.141 
- Lower technical  -0.290 0.518  0.360 -0.351 
- Routine (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.) 
- Salariat*b   0.467****   -0.173**** 
- Intermediate employee'*b   0.040   0.170*** 
- Small employers and self-employed*b   0.209***   0.023 
- Lower sales and service*b   -0.129***   -0.118 
- Lower technical*b   -0.218****   0.179 
- Routine*b (ref.)   (ref.)   (ref.) 
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b) 0.358**** 0.357**** 0.180**** 0.241**** 0.239**** 0.341**** 
- The Social Democrats  -0.130 -1.074****  -0.961* -0.352 
- The Social Liberal Party  0.117 -1.268**  0.540 0.304 
- The Conservative Party  0.504* -0.761**  -0.750 -0.574 
- The Socialist Peoples Party  -0.561** -0.020  -2.197**** 0.497 
- The Danish Peoples Party  0.016 -1.449***  -1.556** -0.255 
- The Liberal Party (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.) 
- The Social Democrats*b   0.281****   -0.078** 
- The Social Liberal Party*b   0.390***   -0.044* 
- The Conservative Party*b   0.332****   0.008 
- The Socialist Peoples Party*b   -0.112**   -0.328**** 
- The Danish Peoples Party*b   0.449****   -0.187*** 
- The Liberal Party*b (ref.)   (ref.)   (ref.) 
Dependent variable: Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b), * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
N (1999): generation-models=1398, class-models=1010, political party-models=1063. N (2009): generation-models=1298, class-models=1209, political party-models=1048. 
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Table 2 portrays an array of results. For our purpose we will only comment on a selection – 
especially the interactions. In accordance with Kjærsgård’s (2012b) results albeit with different 
methods, we see very few instances, where there are actually significant differences in group-
means on the dependent variable
7
. Only the voters of the socialist peoples party consistently 
score much lower, than the voters of the liberal party, which is the reference group. In 2009 a 
voter of the socialist peoples party is estimated on the average to score more than 2 lower on the 
scale of the dependent variable, than a voter of the liberal party, controlled for the effect of the 
perception of the actual level of difference in pay. This is a huge effect and suggests that if there 
are cleavages to be found on the matter of just income differences in Denmark, then they clearly 
follow political orientations.  
It is much more interesting to follow the interactions though, since they describe the level of 
salience of the question of just income differences within various social groups. In general the 
group differences in the correlations are much larger in 1999 than 2009. This is exactly as 
expected, by an evaporated group-consciousness and classic social-democratic polity. Voters of 
the socialist peoples party, the salariat class and maybe the two eldest generations seem to be the 
only groups left with a much weaker correlation than the other respondents in 2009. This means 
they have more salient views on the matter, and possibly a political identity suited for the 
developments revealed by the financial crisis. In 1999 on the other hand, we see much clearer 
pattern: The correlation gets stronger with increasing age, and the lower classes have a weaker 
correlation than the higher ones – suggesting a kind of economic class-consciousness not gone in 
1999.  
The result is thus again in good accordance with the expected. Denmark maintains a quite strong 
aggregated correlation also in 2009. Only very few selected groups - the socialist peoples party, 
the salariat class and maybe the two eldest generations - are able to have as weak correlations as 
the Swedish aggregated bivariate correlation. This is a clear sign that the Danes, although 
shocked by the revelations of the financial crisis - as seen in the perception measures – do not 
have a classic social-democratic polity and corresponding political identities, with which to 
interpret and grasp these revelations. We now turn our attention to Norway. Because Norway, 
                                                          
7
 In contrast to Kjærsgård (2012b), the group-differences are here ”controlled” for the perception of the actual level 
of differences in pay. This probably makes it even more difficult to achieve significant differences from the 
reference group.  
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but not Denmark participated in ISSP 1992, we are able to include a longer time span in the 
analysis. If our assumptions are correct, we should see results quite similar to the Danish ones:    
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TABLE 3. Estimating group variations in attitudes to the just level of differences in pay in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009 in Norway. 
 1992 1999 2009 
 Bivariate Trivariate With interactions Bivariate Trivariate With interactions Bivariate Trivariate With interactions 
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b) 0.410**** 0.409**** 0.389**** 0.427**** 0.407**** 0.354**** 0.137**** 0.138**** 0.255**** 
- Born 1980 and thereafter  - -  0.196 0.050  0.615 -0.527 
- Born 1970-1979  0.411**** 0.019  0.312*** -0.026  0.045 1.266* 
- Born 1960-1969  0.210*** 0.106  0.337**** -0.001  -0.145 1.547** 
- The baby boom generation  0.078 0.098  -0.016 -0.065  -0.489 1.334** 
- War and pre-war generations (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.) 
- Born 1980 and thereafter*b   -   0.054   -0.130**** 
- Born 1970-1979*b   0.104**   0.115   -0.137*** 
- Born 1960-1969*b   0.028   0.114*   -0.191**** 
- The baby boom generation*b   -0.106   0.018   -0.190**** 
- War and pre-war generations*b (ref.)   (ref.)   (ref.)   (ref.) 
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b)    0.430**** 0.434**** 0.233*** 0.146**** 0.146**** 0.016 
- Salariat     0.127 -0.648**  1.009 -1.274* 
- Intermediate employee'     0.100 -0.564**  0.804 -1.212 
- Small employers and self-employed     -0.127 -0.779**  0.081 -0.803 
- Lower sales and service     -0.029 -0.548*  1.386 -2.746*** 
- Lower technical     -0.135 -0.298  3.201*** 2.591** 
- Routine (ref.)     (ref.) (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.) 
- Salariat*b      0.267***   0.201**** 
- Intermediate employee'*b      0.228**   0.157**** 
- Small employers and self-employed*b      0.223**   0.010 
- Lower sales and service*b      0.180*   0.338**** 
- Lower technical*b      0.062   0.000 
- Routine*b (ref.)      (ref.)   (ref.) 
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b) 0.446**** 0.442**** 0.365**** 0.444**** 0.462**** 0.417**** 0.107**** 0.107**** 0.009 
- The Labour Party  0.065 0.200  0.253** 0.105  1.583 -0.621 
- The Party of Progress  0.483*** 0.244  0.306** 0.194  1.263 1.561 
- The Conservative Party  0.757**** -0.148  0.484**** -0.005  1.100 0.694 
- The Christian Democratic Party  0.415*** -0.027  0.290** 0.447  0.404 0.415 
- The Centre Party  0.193 -0.137  0.293* 0.764*  1.266 -0.882 
- The Socialist Left Party (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.) 
- The Labour Party*b   -0.042   0.045   0.283** 
- The Party of Progress*b   0.064   0.034   0.022 
- The Conservative Party*b   0.241****   0.178*   0.069 
- The Christian Democratic Party*b   0.123   -0.064   -0.007 
- The Centre Party*b   0.088   -0.169   0.233* 
- The Socialist Left Party*b (ref.)   (ref.)   (ref.)   (ref.) 
Dependent variable: Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b), * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. 
N (1992): generation-models=1326, political party-models=893. N (1999): generation-models=563, class-models=505, political party-models=447. N (2009): generation-models=1373, class-
models=1261, political party-models=1061. 
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Table 3 reveals that in 1992-1999 there actually seems to be significant differences between 
generations and voters of various political parties on attitudes to the just level of income 
differences, controlled for perceptions of the same. Especially three right-wing parties thus show 
a significantly higher mean value than the other parties. This could indicate that the Norwegian 
political spectrum to a greater extent than in Denmark was defined by the matter in the nineties. 
In 2009 this has all broken down though, and all group-differences are insignificant (except the 
lower technical class). A dramatic shift thus occurs between 1999 and 2009 in Norway. 
What are really interesting are the interactions though. Here the general result is that we in 2009 
see no groups having a markedly weaker correlation than the others. The small employers and 
self-employed have a somewhat stronger correlation, but only marginal differences exist between 
the rest – and none comes close to the level of the low aggregated Swedish correlation in 2009. 
In 1999 there was a weak tendency of a stronger correlation, with rising class. These results even 
more clearly than in Denmark suggests that the Norwegians although shocked by the financial 
crisis, did not anymore have a classic social-democratic polity. In 1999 there are only very weak 
signs and in 2009 there are no social groups with group consciousness and a structural 
perspective mobilised in their political identities. The ultimate test for on our model is Sweden, 
who is supposed to show a very different pattern than Denmark and Norway, because they are 
assumed to a large extent to have maintained their classic social-democratic polity:  
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TABLE 4. Estimating group variations in attitudes to the just level of differences in pay in ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009 in Sweden. 
 1992 1999 2009 
 Bivariate Trivariate With interactions Bivariate Trivariate With interactions Bivariate Trivariate With interactions 
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b) 0.419**** 0.420**** 0.494**** 0.228**** 0.221**** 0.292**** 0.042**** 0.041**** 0.287**** 
- Born 1980 and thereafter  - -  -1.250*** -0.550  -2.822**** 1.270** 
- Born 1970-1979  0.246 -0.021  -0.884**** -0.457  -2.044**** 1.299** 
- Born 1960-1969  -0.049 0.805****  -0.692*** -0.860**  -1.922*** 0.585 
- The baby boom generation  0.111 0.000  -0.892**** 0.001  -1.529*** 1.369*** 
- War and pre-war generations (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.) 
- Born 1980 and thereafter*b   -   -0.136   -0.268**** 
- Born 1970-1979*b   0.123   -0.053   -0.161*** 
- Born 1960-1969*b   -0.248****   0.070   -0.062 
- The baby boom generation*b   0.039   -0.129****   -0.165**** 
- War and pre-war generations*b (ref.)   (ref.)   (ref.)   (ref.) 
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b)    0.226**** 0.222**** 0.126**** 0.041**** 0.041**** 0.019**** 
- Salariat     0.624** 0.251  1.550*** -0.209 
- Intermediate employee'     0.391 -0.347  1.065 -2.305**** 
- Small employers and self-employed     1.678**** -1.442***  2.802*** -2.531*** 
- Lower sales and service     0.074 -0.977**  0.581 -0.756 
- Lower technical     -0.331 -0.299  0.142 -1.081 
- Routine (ref.)     (ref.) (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.) 
- Salariat*b      0.063*   0.142**** 
- Intermediate employee'*b      0.122***   0.362**** 
- Small employers and self-employed*b      0.474****   0.545**** 
- Lower sales and service*b      0.207***   0.134**** 
- Lower technical*b      0.010   0.134** 
- Routine*b (ref.)      (ref.)   (ref.) 
- Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b) 0.338**** 0.325**** 0.717**** 0.192**** 0.192**** 0.280**** 0.231**** 0.228**** 0.040 
- The Centre Party  -0.605 0.917  0.539 -1.691**  0.061 -0.305 
- The Liberal Party  -0.397 1.010  0.447 0.663  1.567* -0.998 
- The Liberal Conservatives  0.092 2.147****  0.470 0.924**  1.480** -0.633 
- The Social Democrats  -0.528 0.613  -0.212 0.494  -0.097 -0.630 
- The Left Party  - -  -1.213*** 0.383  -1.159 -0.740 
- The Christian Democrats (ref. 1992-1999)  (ref.) (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.)  - - 
- The Green Party (ref. 2009)  - -  - -  (ref.) (ref.) 
- The Centre Party*b   -0.375**   0.338****   0.029 
- The Liberal Party*b   -0.340**   -0.039   0.312**** 
- The Liberal Conservatives*b   -0.507****   -0.083   0.259*** 
- The Social Democrats*b   -0.261**   -0.124**   0.091 
- The Left Party*b   -   -0.266****   0.032 
- The Christian Democrats*b (ref. 1999)   (ref.)   (ref.)   - 
- The Green Party*b (ref. 2009)   -   -   (ref.) 
Dependent variable: Attitudes to difference in levels of pay (b), * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001. N (1992): generation-models=618, political party-models=349. N (1999): generation-
models=946, class-models=869, political party-models=626. N (2009): generation-models=998, class-models=937, political party-models=825. 
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Table 4 reveals quite large intergenerational differences in mean values on the dependent 
variable. The differences for between classes and political parties are smaller, than what could be 
expected: Kjærsgård (2012a) actually found quite large differences here. This must mean that the 
differences in the groups mean values to the just level of differences in pay in Sweden to a large 
extent is caused by different perceptions of how big these differences actually are – at least in 
1992-1999. As Kjærsgård (2012a) showed, the younger generations are the most egalitarian, and 
the small employers and self-employed are clearly much less egalitarian, than the rest. The 
comparison of Swedish voters is “hampered” by the fact that most swedes vote for either the 
social democrats or the liberal conservatives. There are in each case very few respondents voting 
for other parties, and it is hard getting significant effects. The results do indicate that the voters 
of the liberal conservatives are less egalitarian, than most other voters in 2009, while the left 
party (Vänsterpartiet) was more egalitarian than others in 1999. These are of course expected 
differences.  
The big question is, whether the interaction effects are different in Sweden, than in Denmark and 
Norway. The general result is yes, but the tendency is not overwhelmingly different from the 
Danish results. In all interaction-models of table 4 some groups have a much weaker correlations 
than others. In 1992 it is especially the 1960-69 generation and to some extent the liberal 
conservatives; in 1999 it is the two lowest classes and the salariat and the left party; in 2009 it is 
the youngest generation and the routine workers and to some extent the non-right-wing parties. 
In 1999 and 2009 the groups, who portray the weakest correlations, are more or less the ones you 
would expect to the matter of income distribution as a most salient part of their political identity 
in a classic social-democratic polity – the left-wing voters and the lower classes. The fact that 
this group also includes the youngest generation suggests that the classic social-democratic polity 
has a grip on the new generations and therefore also the future in Sweden.  
The results of 1992 at first glance seem peculiar tough, while it is totally different groups – the 
liberal conservative voters and the 1960-69 generation – that portray the highest degree of 
salience in their political awareness to the matter. By further consideration the results are not that 
peculiar at all. In the early nineties, Sweden was hit by a severe economic crisis with exploding 
unemployment rates, a negative GDP-growth, enormous interest rates and finally a drastically 
devaluated currency (figure 3 & 4). In figure 1 & 2 we also see that both the trade union density 
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rates in Sweden and the voters share of the social democrats started a steady decline in exactly 
this period. The 1992 result can thus be seen as a consequence of a right-wing awareness and 
revolt against the failed policies of the social democratic led governments of the eighties.  
Conclusion  
This article has developed, presented and tested a theoretical model linking the development of a 
macro level phenomenon – the characteristics of the polity – with the political identities 
(attitudes and perceptions) of the Scandinavians. Starting with the macro-level phenomenon of 
the characteristics of the polity; this article has argued that the Scandinavian countries, in spite 
rather origins in their political history, in recent two decades have followed a quite distinct path. 
It was argued that it looks like Sweden more or less has maintained the original path and the 
classic social-democratic polity. Denmark and Norway on the other hand in the last two decades 
departed more and more from this original path and the classic social-democratic polity.  
In the empirical analyses we tested the claim that this diversified development in the 
characteristics of the polity, could be traced at the micro level on the development in the political 
identities of the Danes, Norwegians and Swedes. We expected to track these changes in the 
political identities on three dimensions, disaggregated on three potential main-cleavages in 
society – generations, social class and political party affiliation: the norms regarding the level of 
just income differences in society, the perception of the actual level of the same and the 
correlation between the two. 
The empirical results in general fitted the expectations quite well, although surprising results 
appeared as well. The aggregated analysis of table 1 revealed that the Swedes departed 
somewhat from the Danes and Norwegians. The financial crisis shock on perceptions of the level 
of income differences appeared more severe in Denmark/Norway than Sweden. In the former 
countries both the medians and standard deviations of all groups exploded comparing the 2009 
results with the 1999-results. In Sweden this was only the case for some of the groups 
investigated. We also know from Kjærsgård (2012a & b) that norms of the Swedes developed 
differently than in Denmark/Norway. In Sweden we consistently see big differences in medians 
between groups, but internal consistency within groups. The opposite is the case in 
Denmark/Norway in 2009. The correlation in all countries is clearly weakened in 2009, being 
very low in Sweden in this year. Because this correlation is argued to be the best measure of a 
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normative salience of the matter of just income differences in the political identities of the 
respondents, the analyses proceeded disaggregating these on social groups in the three countries 
over time.   
The results showed that in Denmark a few groups actually seem having maintained a 
high/Swedish degree of salience of the matter throughout the period. This is especially the voters 
of the socialist peoples party, the salariat class and to some extent the eldest generation. In 1999 
the tendency was even stronger incorporating other lower classes. This result actually hints the 
remnants of the existence of a classic social-democratic polity in Denmark even in 2009, where a 
socialist party is still able to mobilize political identity and consciousness to question of income 
differences in society.  
In Norway on the contrary only in 1999, it is possible to identify weak signs of a tendency for the 
matter to be a little more salient in the lower classes, than in the higher. There are no other clear 
cleavages in correlations in either 1999 or 2009, where even the weak differences between the 
classes have evaporated. Norway, not Denmark thus seems to be the prime example of an 
evaporated classic social-democratic polity.  
Sweden fulfills the expectations and present quite clear class differences in salience in 1999 and 
2009. Here the traditional working class, in the form of the lower social classes and the non-
right-wing political parties, clearly have stronger independent norms regarding the just income 
differences, than other groups. Interestingly the youngest generation of 2009 both score a lower 
median, than other generations and have weaker correlation, than the other generations. The 
youngest generation thus does not seem to follow the Norwegian lead, but instead are politically 
socialized towards the same political-economic cleavages and the classic social-democratic 
polity, as the older generations.  
 
  
31 
 
Appendix 
Denmark 
 
FIGURE 7-8. Perceived difference in levels of pay A for different generations in Denmark in ISSP 
1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations. 
Medians Standard deviations 
  
A
 The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average 
of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.  
N (1999): War and pre-war generations=297, the baby boom generation=462, Born 1960-1969=351, Born 1970-1979=271 and Born 1980 and 
thereafter=59. 
N (2009): War and pre-war generations=246, the baby boom generation=398, Born 1960-1969=297, Born 1970-1979=209 and Born 1980 and 
thereafter=198. 
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FIGURE 9-10. Perceived difference in levels of pay A for 6 different social classes in Denmark in 
ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations. 
Medians Standard deviations 
  
A
 The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average 
of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index. 
N (1999): Salariat=413, Intermediate employee=232, Small employers and self-employed=57, Lower sales and service=115, lower technical=97, 
Routine=128. 
N (2009): Salariat=530, Intermediate employee=275, Small employers and self-employed=62, Lower sales and service=151, lower technical=70, 
Routine=165. 
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FIGURE 11-12. Perceived difference in levels of pay A for people voting for various political 
parties on the last general election in Denmark in ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and 
standard deviations. 
Medians Standard deviations 
  
A
 The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average 
of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.  
N (1999): The Social Democrats=367, The Social Liberal Party=68, The Conservative Party=117, The Socialist Peoples Party=141, The Danish 
Peoples Party=75, The Liberal Party=324. 
N (2009): The Social Democrats=283, The Social Liberal Party=70, The Conservative Party=103, The Socialist Peoples Party=211, The Danish 
Peoples Party=114, The Liberal Party=306. 
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Norway 
 
FIGURE 13-14. Perceived difference in levels of pay A for different generations in Norway in 
ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations. 
Medians Standard deviations 
  
A
 The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average 
of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index. 
N (1992): War and pre-war generations=426, The baby boom generation=429, Born 1960-1969=321, Born 1970-1979=218. 
N (1999): War and pre-war generations=143, The baby boom generation=158, Born 1960-1969=144, Born 1970-1979=127. 
N (2009): War and pre-war generations=183, The baby boom generation=416, Born 1960-1969=302, Born 1970-1979=276, Born 1980 and 
thereafter=218. 
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FIGURE 15-16. Perceived difference in levels of pay A for 6 different social classes in Norway in 
ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations. 
Medians Standard deviations 
  
A
 The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average 
of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index. 
N (1999): Salariat=202, Intermediate employee=103, Small employers and self-employed=54, Lower sales and service=79, lower technical=30, 
Routine=67. 
N (2009): Salariat=575, Intermediate employee=306, Small employers and self-employed=56, Lower sales and service=164, lower technical=78, 
Routine=102. 
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FIGURE 17-18. Perceived difference in levels of pay A for people voting for various political 
parties on the last general election in Norway in ISSP1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians 
and standard deviations. 
Medians Standard deviations 
  
A
 The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average 
of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.  
N (1992): The Labour Party=281, The Party of Progress=79, The Conservative Party=224, The Christian Democratic Party=63, The Centre 
Party=132, The Socialist Left Party=160. 
N (1999): The Labour Party=130, The Party of Progress=66, The Conservative Party=123, The Christian Democratic Party=58, The Centre 
Party=32, The Socialist Left Party=64.  
N (2009): The Labour Party=367, The Party of Progress=225, The Conservative Party=292, The Christian Democratic Party=37, The Centre 
Party=81, The Socialist Left Party=72. 
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Sweden 
 
FIGURE 19-20. Perceived difference in levels of pay A for different generations in Sweden in 
ISSP 1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations. 
Medians Standard deviations 
  
A
 The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average 
of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index. 
N (1992): War and pre-war generations=286, The baby boom generation=214, Born 1960-1969=140, Born 1970-1979=28. 
N (1999): War and pre-war generations=282, The baby boom generation=301, Born 1960-1969=199, Born 1970-1979=185, Born 1980 and 
thereafter=43. 
N (2009): War and pre-war generations=182, The baby boom generation=308, Born 1960-1969=204, Born 1970-1979=181, Born 1980 and 
thereafter=163. 
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FIGURE 21-22. Perceived difference in levels of pay A for 6 different social classes in Sweden in 
ISSP 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians and standard deviations. 
Medians Standard deviations 
  
A
 The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average 
of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory. In 1992 shop assistants are not in the index. 
N (1999): Salariat=317, Intermediate employee=188, Small employers and self-employed=52, Lower sales and service=183, lower technical=67, 
Routine=118. 
N (2009): Salariat=399, Intermediate employee=184, Small employers and self-employed=37, Lower sales and service=173, lower technical=68, 
Routine=115. 
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FIGURE 23-24. Perceived difference in levels of pay A for people voting for various political 
parties on the last general election in Sweden in ISSP1992, 1999 and 2009. Shown are medians 
and standard deviations. 
Medians Standard deviations 
  
A
 The index is created at the individual level by dividing the salary indication of a chairman of a large national corporation and with the average 
of the lower level occupations: a shop assistant and an unskilled worker in a factory.  
N (1992): The Centre Party=40, The Liberal Party= 53, The Liberal Conservatives= 118, The Social Democrats= 134. 
N (1999): The Centre Party=32, The Liberal Party= 49, The Liberal Conservatives= 165, The Social Democrats= 256, The Christian Democrats= 80, 
The Left Party= 89. 
N (2009): The Centre Party=60, The Liberal Party= 74, The Liberal Conservatives= 265, The Social Democrats= 329, The Left Party= 63, The Green 
Party= 64. 
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